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In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger characterizes the reduction of the 
world to “pure resource” as the crisis of modernity.
Introduction 
1 This crisis is rooted in 
“metaphysics” and the subjection of nature for the purposes of production and 
consumption. Metaphysics refers to the prioritization of a particular worldview to the 
exclusion of all others, and the reduction of the world to pure resource counts as a 
crisis insofar as it leads to the violation of nature, humanity’s homelessness, and a 
loss of the gods. Though Heidegger has a keen sense for the problems plaguing 
modernity, he also tells us that the crisis resulting from our technological worldview 
is not simply the product of human intention but is also sent to us by Being. 
Moreover, Heidegger claims “human activity can never counter the danger,” and it 
seems that all we can do is wait for the arrival of a new revelation of reality that will 
redeem our culture from its fallen state. Critics of Heidegger’s work see it as 
“condemning man to a total subjection to history and its fateful sending’s”2 and they 
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argue that his appeal to waiting “precludes every attempt to build from the ruins of 
our culture a house in which we can dwell.”3 Against these critics, this essay 
illustrates the extent to which waiting actually serves as an appropriate response to 
metaphysical thinking and the harm it produces in our technological age. Briefly, the 
idea is that waiting gives human beings a chance to reflect on the contingency of their 
current circumstances and thereby opens them up to the possibility that things may be 
otherwise. And once we’ve realized that things can be otherwise, we are in principle 
open to gods that are capable of gathering human communities in new ways, treating 
nature as filled with sacred things, and seeing that the rich and meaningful world in 
which we dwell is not subordinate to the world as it is presented in our technological 
activities. 
Before turning to the crises produced by our technological mode of being, we need to 
say something about the cause of these crises, “metaphysics”, and the relationship 
between metaphysics and two key concepts in Heidegger’s Seinsphilosophie: Being 
and Mystery. Being is “that which determines entities as entities.”
Being, Mystery, and Metaphysics 
4 And in Being and 
Time, Heidegger says every human is thrown into a socio-historical “truth of Being” 
whereby: “The everyday way in which things have been disclosed is one into which 
Dasein has grown in the first instance… In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine 
understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating 
anew, are preformed.”5
 
 
Though truths of Being are difficult to define because they are the background upon 
which we are able to define anything at all, Hubert Dreyfus exemplifies this 
phenomenon when he writes: “The Greeks encountered things in their beauty and 
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power, and people as poets, statesmen and heroes; the Christians encountered 
creatures to be catalogued and used appropriately, and people as saints and sinners; 
and we moderns encounter objects to be controlled and organized by subjects in order 
to satisfy their desires.”6
 
 Although it may be difficult to tease out the entire concrete 
content of the Greek, Christian and Modern worldviews, formally these truths of 
Being are the set of practices, rules and relations that create the context through which 
all aspects of the Greek, Christian and Modern worlds are presented or make sense. 
Whilst Being enables particular entities to show up as a meaningful part of our world, 
Being itself is not an entity. In What are Poets For?, Heidegger borrows Rilke’s 
image of Being as a sphere that, like the moon, has a light and dark side: “Being in 
the sense of a lightening-unifying presence” and Being in the sense of “beings...in the 
plentitude of all their facets.”7 Being, in other words, is comprised of a series of 
cultural practices that disclose the world in a specific way as well as the entities and 
aspects of the world disclosed in those practices. But Being is also made up of those 
entities that are concealed in our current culture. And in On the Essence of Truth, 
Heidegger calls the aspects of Being that are constantly turned way from us “the 
Mystery”.8
 
 
The Mystery of Being is key to understanding Heidegger’s account of metaphysics. 
Metaphysics aims to state “what beings are in their Being” and it refers to the truth of 
Being that “transcends” the aspects of our world such that they appear as the aspects 
that they are.9 Metaphysics, however, “regards such truth as the imperishable and 
eternal,” and it misses the fact that the disclosure of our world is relative to the 
practices of an historical community.10 By treating the world disclosure achieved in a 
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specific culture as “imperishable and eternal”, metaphysical interpretations of Being 
“drive out every other possibility of revealing.”11 In doing so, metaphysics errs by 
blocking access to the entities that are concealed in our current culture, and it is 
precisely the metaphysics of modern technology that prevents us from revealing the 
world in alternative ways. 
The essence of modern technology is, for Heidegger, das Gestell or the “enframing” 
of our world in which “the real reveals itself as resource.”
Modern Technology and Metaphysics 
12 The real reveals itself as 
resource through technological production, and this production refers to our ability to 
represent the world such that we are able to manufacture and manipulate things to 
meet various ends.  As Heidegger writes in What are Poets For?: “Man places before 
himself the world as the whole of everything objective, and he places himself against 
that world. Man sets up the world toward himself, and delivers Nature over to 
himself. We must think of this placing-here, this producing, in its broad and 
multifarious nature.”13
 
 
Heidegger’s generic use of “man” in this passage suggests that production is a 
universal feature of human existence, and he recognizes that the Ancient Greeks 
represented the world in resourceful ways that resemble our own. Yet what 
distinguishes the “gentle” technological practice of the Greeks from the “violent” 
technological practices of modernity is the extent to which the former “brings forth” 
nature whereas the later “set upon” nature in order to make something happen. And to 
come to terms with the dangers of contemporary technology we need to say more 
about Heidegger’s distinction between ancient and modern technological practice. 
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On Heidegger’s reading, the productive activity of the Greeks was a species of poiesis 
or “bringing forth”. Poiesis divides into two types – physis as the unaided bringing 
forth of nature, and techne as the aided bringing forth of the craftsman – and each is a 
case of “letting what is not yet present arrive in its presencing.”14 Techne is 
nevertheless continuous with physis insofar as the Greeks saw themselves as part of a 
sacred order in which their activities spared, preserved or completed nature’s 
presencing. Heidegger cites as an example of techne the ancient cabinetmaker who 
“answers and responds to all the different kinds of wood and the shapes slumbering 
within the wood as it enters into man’s dwelling with the hidden riches of nature.”15
 
 
Since the Greeks treated their building as continuous with nature, and given that they 
saw the natural world as the basis of their sustenance, the Greek world showed up as a 
holy place worthy of reverence and respect. 
In contrast to Greek production, Heidegger characterizes modern production as a 
“setting upon” nature in order to reframe it when it fails to meet our needs. Like 
Greek technological practices, the real reveals itself as resource in modernity.  But 
what worries Heidegger about modern production is the way the real reveals itself 
simply as resource through our “unconditional self-assertion”.16 The reduction of the 
world to pure resource for our consumption connects Heidegger’s talk of 
contemporary technology to his discussion of metaphysics. For when Gestell “holds 
sway”, Heidegger says, “it drives out every other possibility of revealing.”17 Driving 
out every other possibility of revealing in the age of Gestell means that “what is 
unconcealed no longer concerns man even as an object, but does so, rather, 
exclusively as resource.”18 In other words, entities “no longer stand over and against 
us as objects”, but show up as “completely unautonomous”.19 And as completely 
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unautonomous, entities no longer appear as they are in-and-of-themselves or as 
entities capable of being “brought forth” in our practical activities. Put otherwise, 
treating entities as just for us suggests that they are no longer part of a sacred order of 
which we are only a part. Thus, we moderns find ourselves in a world that no longer 
commands reverence and respect. 
Reducing our world to resources for production and consumption is, for Heidegger, 
the crisis of modernity. Such a reduction counts as a crisis insofar as it results in the 
violation of nature, humanity’s homelessness, and a loss of the gods. The violation of 
nature that contemporary production entails is a function of our inability to see 
entities as they are in-and-of-themselves, and it is an essential harm insofar as it 
prevents an entity from being the entity that it is.  If, for example, the forest shows up 
as nothing but grist for our mills, or a river as nothing more than a power source, then 
the forest and river show up as nothing other than resourceful entities-for-us, and 
nothing stands apart from our technological will to act as a condition or limit upon our 
exploitation of nature. In Heidegger’s words, “what is, in its entirety, is now taken in 
such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by 
man.”
The Ills of Modern Technology 
20
 
 And by reducing the world to whatever shows up as useful, our modern 
technological mode of Being takes away our ability to stand in what Heidegger calls a 
“caring” relationship to things as they are in themselves. 
Caring for things is, however, essential to being at home in the world. To be at home, 
for Heidegger, is to be taken-care-of by our dwelling-place whilst at the same time 
caring-for our dwelling-place. A home, in other words, provides us with a certain 
amount of safety and security. But a home can only provide us with that safety and 
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security if the home itself is taken care of. Of course if the things that take care of us 
in our home do not show up as objects to be cared-for, then there is little to stop us 
from doing damage to that which takes care of us. And this is why Heidegger says our 
current violent relation to nature leads to “man’s homelessness.” 
 
Finally, reducing the world to pure resource results in a loss of the gods. According to 
Heidegger, the gods gather human communities by standing out as exemplars that 
give meaning to a particular way of life. Yet in modernity, “no god any longer gathers 
men and things unto himself, visibly and unequivocally, and by such gathering 
disposes the world’s history and man’s sojourn in it.”21 This loss of gods is due the 
abolition of “the divine radiance...in the world’s history” or “the holy ether in which 
alone the gods are gods.”22 The holy ether of which Heidegger speaks is a world filled 
with sacred things that are sacred because they are the gifts upon which our existence 
depends. But when the world is reduced to resource things no longer show up as 
sacred, and our disenchanted age deprives the gods of that holy place from which they 
derive their authority. Alas, without a sacred space through which the gods can inspire 
human beings there is nothing left in our world (beyond force) to command our 
collective awe, and we inevitably find ourselves busied but lost in the dullness of the 
everyday. 
The problems plaguing modernity are a function of metaphysics whereby “the 
unconditioned establishment of unconditional self-assertion” results in a world that is  
“purposefully made over according to the frame of mind of man’s command.”
Modern Technology as a Destining of Being and the Overcoming of Metaphysics 
Through Waiting and Releasement 
23 This, 
for Heidegger, means human willing “turns everything into material for self-assertive 
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production” through which “the earth and its atmosphere become raw material for 
self-assertive production” and “man becomes human material that is disposed of with 
a view to proposed goals.”24 Heidegger, however, tells us that the crisis resulting from 
our productive activities is not simply a product of human intentions but is also 
“destined” to us by Being. The fact that the devastation of modernity is accomplished 
through our will but destined by Being means that “human activity can never counter 
the danger”25 and that we must wait for “a god [that] can save us.”26
 
 It seems, then, 
that all we can do on Heidegger’s account is stop what we are doing, release ourselves 
to Being, and hope that a new revelation of reality that will redeem our culture from 
its degraded state. 
As noted above, critics of Heidegger’s work see it as “condemning man to a total 
subjection to history and its fateful sending’s,”27 and they argue that his appeal to 
waiting “precludes every attempt to build from the ruins of our culture a house in 
which we can dwell.”28 On Richard Wolin’s reading, Heidegger’s “solution” to the 
danger confronting modernity actually places us in an “impotent bondage” to Being 
where “real-life men and women are no longer seen as responsible for the course of 
history.”29 In fact, Wolin goes so far as to say that Heidegger endows “Being with the 
characteristics of an all-powerful meta-subject” so as to avoid owning up to his Nazis 
past.30
 
 Yet in order to test the validity of these criticisms, we need to look closer at the 
“destining of Being” as well as the dispositions that Heidegger’s thinks will help us 
overcome metaphysics: namely, waiting and releasement. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger claims “Being (but not entities) is something which 
“there is” only insofar as truth is. And truth is only so far as and as long as Dasein 
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is.”31 This passage suggests that Being is dependant on us. But Heidegger also says 
that “Being is always the Being of an entity,”32 which implies that entities also play a 
part in the determination of their Being. It is the part entities play in the determination 
of their Being that enable’s Heidegger to speak of a “destining of Being”: that is, 
entities are always sent to us in their plentitude and we appropriate specific aspects of 
that plentitude through our activities. Therefore Gestell is a “destining of Being” 
insofar as entities are given to us and we appropriate them as resources. However, this 
destining means “something different from the talk we hear more and more frequently 
to the effect that technology is the fate of our age, where ‘fate’ means ‘the 
inevitability of an unalterable course,’”33 and Heidegger claims that our current 
technological practice “in no way confines us to a stultifying compulsion to push on 
blindly with technology or...to rebel helplessly against it and curse it as the work of 
the devil.”34
 
 Gestell, for Heidegger, is not the inevitable and unalterable course of 
history, since it stands as only one of the various ways in which the world may be 
given to us. And in order to be saved from the ills of our contemporary technological 
practices, we need to open ourselves up to alternative destinings of Being. 
According to Heidegger, opening up to an alternative destining is achieved through 
waiting and releasement. In a moment of waiting, we are released from our 
fascination with the entities disclosed in the productive activities that make up our 
everyday existence. And much like an instant of anxiety, waiting gives us a chance to 
reflect on the contingency of our current circumstances and thereby recognize that 
things can be otherwise. As Heidegger puts it in Being and Time, “in anxiety what is 
environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away.” Thus, anxiety “takes away from Dasein 
the possibility of understanding itself in terms of the world and the way things have 
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been publically interpreted,” and it sets us before the world as a whole.35 Similarly, 
Heidegger says “waiting releases us into openness” where “we leave open what we 
are waiting for” such that we are “open to the horizon of that-which-regions.”36 In our 
current case, Heidegger suggests waiting allows us to “catch sight of the essence of 
modern technology” and therefore “bring into appearance the saving power in its 
arising.”37 Waiting, in other words, provides us with the pause we need to see that the 
metaphysical assumptions of our technological age mistakenly “drives out every other 
possibility of revealing.”38 And once we are released from our metaphysical illusion, 
we are in principle open to seeing things as something other than resources and 
indeed to the Mystery of Being more generally.  As Heidegger puts it: “Releasement 
towards things and openness to the Mystery belong together. They grant us the 
possibility of dwelling in the world in a totally different way. They promise us a new 
ground and foundation upon which we can stand and endure the world of technology 
without being imperiled by it.”39
 
 
In short, waiting and releasement let entities be such that we can see there is a world 
that stands beyond the confines of our willful productive activities. And it should now 
be clear that Heidegger’s appeal to waiting and releasement as the antidote to the 
dangers of technology does not condemn man to history’s fateful sendings. For it is 
precisely when we are released from willful productive activity that we create a 
context in which nature shows up as the sacred basis upon which both divinities and 
mortals dwell. 
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